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Abstract: Using two data sets from the same source but in different years (1994 and 
1997) and regions (Northeast and Southeast), benefit transfer estimates are compared 
with original estimates to examine the convergent validity of benefit function transfer.  
Although benefit transfer error could go up to over 400% of original estimates for a 
particular case, the magnitude of benefit transfer error is less than 100% of original 
estimates for most cases.  Since two data sets used for benefit transfer are from different 
regions and years, whether regional or temporal variation is more responsible for benefit 
transfer error can not be determined without intra-regional or intra-temporal data.  
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Introduction 
  Benefit transfer generally refers to the practice of applying estimates of economic 
value obtained from one or more original valuation studies in one context to the 
evaluation of economic value in another context by adaptively transferring available 
information (value estimates or estimated benefit/demand function) from existing 
primary studies.  Following Desvousges, Naughton, and Parsons (1992), a place for 
which original research was conducted is called a “study site” and a place to which 
estimates of economic value from original research are transferred is called a “policy 
site.”  As a less costly and time saving method of obtaining estimates of non-market 
value for various outdoor recreation activities, the primary goal of benefit transfer 
practice is to estimate economic benefits of non-market activities with an acceptable 
degree of accuracy for one context (a policy site) by adaptively transferring benefit 
estimates or a benefit function from some other context (a study site) when it is too costly 
or takes too much time to conduct a primary valuation study.   
  Benefit transfer provides a means by which economic value of an outdoor 
recreation activity at an unstudied policy site can be estimated using information 
available from a study site(s).  For instance, economic value of marine recreational 
fishing in a particular state or region could be estimated by transferring estimates of 
economic value of marine recreational fishing from the original valuation study 
conducted in another state or region after adjusting to new circumstances (policy site 
context), especially to different characteristics of angler population and fishing sites.  
Although this study focuses on transferring economic estimates of non-market value of 
marine recreational fishing, benefit transfer techniques discussed here could be more   3 
broadly applied in a number of other outdoor recreation activities.  By providing 
preliminary measures of economic value estimates in various circumstances, benefit 
transfer may also be applied in screening agricultural policies, evaluating environmental 
policies (e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) (1997) assessment of the 
Clean Air Act), defining the extent of the market affected by a proposed policy, initial 
screening of natural resource damage assessment, and determining whether original 
research is warranted (Rosenberger and Loomis 2003).   
  After a brief overview of the current literature on benefit transfer, benefit transfer 
technique is applied to the estimation of marine recreational fishing value in the 
Northeast and Southeast coastal regions of the United States using data from the National 
Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey 
(MRFSS) combined with the Add-On MRFSS Economic Survey (AMES) in 1994 and 
1997 respectively.  The convergent validity of benefit transfer is examined by comparing 
the value estimates obtained from benefit transfer procedures to the value estimates 
obtained from original non-market valuation research.  
 
An Overview of Benefit Transfer Methodology 
  Benefit transfer is a practical methodology in evaluating the economic 
consequences of environmental policies and programs with an underlying assumption 
that economic benefits and/or costs associated with a particular environmental 
commodity or change could be extrapolated from existing valuation studies of similar 
context.  In possibly many circumstances, primary research may not be justified or 
plausible due to budget constraint and/or time limitation necessitating the application of   4 
an alternative benefit transfer method.  However, this low cost and less time-consuming 
alternative method for non-market valuation may only be valid and reliable under special 
circumstances.  In addition, there are also several important limitations associated with 
the application of benefit transfer even when these special circumstances are satisfied.  
Before a discussion of performing and checking the validity of benefit transfer, we need 
to discuss the circumstances under which benefit transfer methods can be meaningfully 
carried out and potential limitations of these methods.       
 
Necessary Conditions for Successful Benefit Transfer 
  For economically meaningful benefit transfer when primary research for a policy 
site is not plausible, there are some necessary conditions that should be satisfied 
(Desvousges, Naughton, and Parsons 1992; Rosenberger and Loomis 2001). 
  First, the policy site context should be thoroughly defined.  The extent, magnitude, 
and quantification of the expected impacts from the proposed policy action should be 
identified.  The availability of current data at the policy site and further data needs for 
benefit transfer should be identified, including the type of measurement (unit, average, or 
marginal value), the kind of value measured (use, nonuse, or total value), and the degree 
of certainty surrounding the transferred information (i.e., the accuracy and precision of 
transferred estimates). 
  Second, the study site should meet certain conditions for successful benefit 
transfer.  It is necessary that original studies transferred should be based on adequate data, 
sound economic method, and correct empirical technique (Freeman 1984).  The statistical 
relationships between economic benefits (or costs) and both socio-economic   5 
characteristics of the affected population and physical/environmental characteristics of 
the study site should be contained in the original study.  In addition, an adequate number 
of original studies on a particular recreation activity for similar sites would allow us to 
carry out more reliable statistical inferences. 
  Finally, the study and policy sites should exhibit an adequate level of similarity in 
terms of the environmental resource evaluated, the nature of an environmental change, 
and the characteristics of the affected populations and sites.  The conditions and quality 
of the recreation activity analyzed should be similar, including intensity, duration, and 
skill requirement.  Unless enough information on own and substitute prices is available, 
the markets for the study and policy sites should be similar.  The quality and quantity of 
the change in the environmental resource at the study site should be similar to those of 
the expected change in the environmental resource at the policy site, including the 
measurability and the source of the change.  The similarity of socio-economic profiles of 
the affected populations and the characteristics of the environmental resource of interest 
between the study site and the policy site is an important requirement for a successful 
application of benefit transfer.  Benefit transfer applications work better when the 
attributes of the environmental resource, the nature of the environmental change, the 
characteristics of the affected populations and sites display an adequate level of 
similarities between the study site and the policy site. 
   
Potential Limitations of Benefit Transfer   
  Several studies (Boyle and Bergstrom 1992; Desvousges, Naughton, and Parsons 
1992; Navrud and Pruckner 1997; Desvousges, Johnson, and Banzhaf 1998; Bergstrom   6 
and De Civita 1999; Azqueta and Touza 2000; Brouwer 2000; Rosenberger and Loomis 
2001) collectively provide a comprehensive overview on potential problems associated 
with the application of benefit transfer methods.  
  First, the most fundamental limitation of benefit transfer methods stems from the 
quality of the original valuation study.  Brookshire and Neill (1992) point out that benefit 
transfer estimates cannot be more reliable than the original study estimates upon which 
they are based, and the problems associated with the original non-market valuation study 
will only be magnified in the benefit transfer process.  Although there are no clear 
guidelines for evaluating the quality of original studies, both Desvousges, Naughton, and 
Parsons (1992) and Boyle and Bergstrom (1992) suggest some criteria.  Their criteria 
include adequate data, sound economic method, and correct empirical technique; 
similarities between the study site and the policy site in terms of non-market activity, 
environmental change, and relevant markets and populations affected; description of non-
market value as a function of socio-economic variables and site characteristics; and 
proper assignment of property rights leading to the same theoretically appropriate welfare 
measures at both study and policy sites.   
  Second, an important limitation can also arise from the availability of relevant 
original valuation studies.  Finding appropriate valuation studies that correspond to the 
policy site context could be difficult.  For some recreation activities, only a small number 
of original valuation studies may exist although this issue can be improved as more 
original non-market valuation studies are implemented by providing a greater pool of 
non-market value estimates upon which benefit transfer could be based.  As more original 
valuation studies are conducted, these studies could be made more easily accessible to the   7 
researchers conducting benefit transfer studies by establishing a nationwide or worldwide 
database system of both published and unpublished non-market valuation studies 
containing data sets, estimation techniques, and actual welfare estimates. 
  Third, the degree of correspondence between the study site and the policy site 
affects the efficiency and effectiveness of benefit transfer methods.  Benefit transfer 
could produce inaccurate estimates due to the lack of similarities between the study site 
and the policy site in terms of site and population-specific characteristics.  Some original 
studies may estimate different non-market values of particular recreation activities at 
unique recreation sites under unique circumstances, leading to quite different estimated 
values.  Different temporal and spatial dimensions of the study and policy sites, let alone 
among original studies, could affect the stability of data and value estimates over time 
and across locations.  Since existing valuation studies usually occur at different points in 
time and/or locations, the extent of the affected populations and resources may not be 
directly comparable. 
  Fourth, many subjective judgments, sometimes inevitably, involved in the process 
of benefit transfer may affect the validity and/or reliability of value estimates obtained 
from benefit transfer.  Usually, benefit transfer practitioners should make a number of 
assumptions and professional judgments in applying benefit transfer methods: “There is 
no simple, acceptable way mechanically to transfer a model.  Just as the chief ingredient 
in model construction is judgment, it is also the most important ingredient in transferring 
benefits” (McConnell 1992).  For instance, researchers may often need to make 
assumptions about how to measure environmental quality and how the proposed changes 
in measured environmental quality affect behavior.  In addition, the crucial assumption   8 
for empirically testing the validity of benefit transfer estimates is that the original study 
estimates available at the policy site are the “true value” of the environmental resource 
being evaluated, and benefit transfer estimates can be validated by comparing them with 
the assumed true value (convergent validity test).  These assumptions and professional 
judgments regarding many aspects of benefit transfer methods may introduce greater 
subjectivity and uncertainty into the analysis.  An important question to be addressed is 
whether the added subjectivity and uncertainty surrounding benefit transfer methods are 
acceptable, and resulting benefit transfer estimates still provide informative results.   
  Finally, several methodological issues should be addressed as possible limitations 
of benefit transfer.  Different research and statistical methods used across existing 
valuation studies could lead to significant differences in estimated values.  In estimating 
non-market value of various recreation activities, original studies may apply revealed 
(stated) preference techniques which indirectly (directly) estimate consumer surplus 
(willingness to pay).  Revealed preference techniques rely on the weak complementarity 
(no non-use value) assumption between a recreation activity and market goods necessary 
to participate in the activity, implying that environmental amenity has no effect on the 
individual’s welfare unless market goods required for recreation experience are 
purchased.  Stated preference techniques rely on the constructed hypothetical markets 
through which people’s willingness to pay for environmental resources or recreation 
opportunities are derived.  Original studies may estimate different types of non-market 
value using different methodologies with different definitions of a relevant market, 
making the comparison of various existing studies more difficult and problematic.  
   The potential limitations illustrated above could lead to biased benefit transfer    9 
estimates and decrease the robustness of benefit transfer procedure.  Although original 
study estimates are approximations themselves and therefore subject to many sources of 
errors, potential limitations of benefit transfer process itself should be minimized by 
attempting to identify and control most relevant limitations for each benefit transfer 
application.     
 
Benefit Transfer Application: Marine Recreational Fishing  
  The importance of and need for efficient and effective management programs for 
recreational fisheries as a renewable resource have been recognized to accomplish an 
economically and biologically sustainable level of harvest (catch and keep).  With 15 to 
17 million marine recreational anglers taking over 86 million fishing trips and harvesting 
over 189 million fish weighing almost 266 million pounds (over 254 million fish were 
caught and released) in 2001, marine recreational fishing could have significant economic 
impacts on coastal regions and the areas where market goods related to marine 
recreational fishing are produced, let alone a large impact on available fish stocks (the 
MRFSS).  To develop fishery management policies and evaluate the impacts of resulting 
regulations on marine recreational anglers and fisheries, the NMFS collects data on the 
number and socio-economic characteristics of marine recreational anglers; total number 
of fishing trips by them; and the number, size composition, and weight of recreational 
harvest through the MRFSS combined with the AMES.   
  The method of function transfer is applied to evaluate how well benefit transfer 
performs in the estimation of non-market recreational value associated with marine 
recreational fishing in the coastal areas of the U.S. using two original valuation studies   10 
with a high level of correspondence in many aspects (Table 1).  Using a two-stage nested 
random utility model (NRUM) for single day marine recreational fishing trips, both 
Hicks et al. (1999) and Haab, Whitehead, and McConnell (2001) estimate the economic 
value associated with access to county-level zone fishing sites (willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the opportunity of marine recreational fishing in a particular area) and a one unit 
increase in five-year historic harvest rate (willingness to pay for the better opportunity of 
catching fish) using the Northeast (NE) 1994 and Southeast (SE) 1997 MRFSS-AMES 
data respectively.  Both NE and SE coastal regions in the U.S. are considered as potential 
candidates for both the study site and the policy site in carrying out function transfer.  
The results of original estimations (NE 1994 and SE 1997) are compared with the results 
of benefit transfer estimations to empirically assess the convergent validity (the 
percentage difference between the assumed true value and transferred value) of benefit 
function transfer estimates in a marine recreational fishing environment with MRFSS 
data. 
 
Original Estimation Model    
  A marine recreational angler is assumed to jointly choose target species and 
fishing mode at the first stage, and then choose among mutually exclusive fishing sites 
based on their attributes at the second stage (two-stage mode/species-site choice model).  
If we denote alternative sites and mode-species combinations with j (1,…,63 (NE 1994) 
or 70 (SE 1997)) and sm (1,…,15) respectively, an indirect utility function of an arbitrary 
angler can be written as (following Haab, Whitehead, and McConnell 2001) 
    11 
(1)  njsm = b1cj + b2ttj + g1logMj +  jsm s
s




2 g + ejsm 
 
where njsm is the deterministic utility for site j and mode/species combination sm, cj is the 
travel cost to site j, ttj is the travel time for those who cannot value the travel-time at the 
wage rate, Mj is the number of intercept sites in the aggregated county level zone, qjsm is 
five-year historic harvest rate for species s through mode m at site j, ds is a species 
dummy variable, and ejsm is a generalized extreme value random error term.   
  The probability of choosing site j conditional on mode/species choice sm, 
mode/species-specific inclusive value, and probability of choosing mode/species 
combination sm are 
 
(2)  Prob(j|sm) = exp[(b1cj +b2ttj + g1logMj +  jsm s
s
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(3)  Ism = ln(￿h exp[(b1ch +b2tth + g1logMh +  hsm s
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(4)  Prob(sm) = exp(qs Ism)/ ￿n exp(qs In) 
 
where qs is a species-specific inclusive value parameter and Ism is the mode/species-
specific inclusive value.  The estimation of the second stage site choice decision 
(equation (2)) yields the estimates of (b, g)/qs, and then the inclusive values (equation 
(3)) can be calculated using these parameter estimates for the estimation of the first stage   12 
mode-species choice decision (equation (4)).  In both NE 1994 and SE 1997 data, the 
inclusive value parameters for the four targeted species groups are assumed to be the 
same (qT), and the inclusive value parameter for the non-targeted species is assumed to be 
different (qNT) since the pattern of substitution between sites is expected to differ for 
those who do not target a particular species.  Hicks et al. (1999), however, don’t allow the 
inclusive value parameter for the anglers with no target species to differ.  
  The standard welfare measure from a nested logit random utility recreational 
fishing model that is linear in travel cost compares the expected maximum utility after 
policy change (V
1) with a baseline level of the expected maximum utility (V
0), and then 
converts the difference into a money metric by normalizing with the marginal utility of 
income (b1).  Given the indirect utility function in equation (1), the expected maximum 











































where the first summation is over the 12 mode/species combinations that contain targeted 







jnm) is the estimated indirect utility function evaluated at 
independent variable values under situation z.   
  It is possible to introduce a policy regime that changes the value of independent 
variables included in the indirect utility function.  Two policy situations considered in the 
analysis are a closure of all fishing sites in a state during a particular wave and an   13 
increase in the historic harvest rate at all fishing sites in a state for each species group to 
measure the access value of fishing in the state for all anglers and the marginal 
willingness to pay for a one fish increase in the harvest rate at all sites respectively.  In 
these cases, the expected maximum utility is adjusted by either eliminating the affected 
sites (j) or increasing harvest rates (qjsm) from the corresponding summations in equation 
(5).  The willingness to pay for a policy change or the welfare change from policy 
situation z = 0 to z = 1 (assuming welfare enhancing change) can be measured as  
 





0 is a baseline level of the expected maximum utility under situation 0, V
1 is the 
expected maximum utility after a policy change to situation 1, and  1 b  is the estimate of 
travel cost coefficient obtained from the estimation of the second stage site choice 
decision (equation (2)). 
 
Original Welfare Estimation 
  Tables 2 and 3 present welfare estimates of the mean value of access per trip by 
state and two-month wave and willingness to pay for a one fish increase in historic 
harvest rate per trip by state and species group from NE 1994 and SE 1997 models 
respectively.  At the first stage estimation (conditional site choice decision given mode-
species combination) of a two-stage nested RUM, all parameter estimates are normalized 
by inclusive value parameter.  Since we assume different inclusive value parameters for 
four targeted species groups (?T) and other non-targeted species group (?NT), a weighted   14 
inclusive value parameter is used to recover b1 in equation (6).  The proportions of 
anglers with any of four targeted species groups and non-targeted species group in the 
sample are used as corresponding weights.     
  In NE 1994 model (Table 2), Virginia (22% of total fishing trips) has the largest 
access value followed by New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Maine 
while New Hampshire (4.6% of total fishing trips) has the lowest access value among the 
Northeastern coastal states for all waves.  There is no particular wave that generally has 
larger access value among all Northeastern states although the largest proportion (34.2%) 
of fishing trips occurs in wave 4 (July-August).  Big game species group provides the 
largest gain per trip from a one fish increase in 5-year historic harvest rate followed by 
flat fish and small game species groups while bottom fish species group provides the 
lowest gain per trip in all Northeastern states.  For all targeted species groups, Maine and 
Maryland show relatively larger gains per trip from a one fish increase in harvest rate 
although variations are not very considerable. 
  In SE 1997 model (Table 3), Florida (60.26% of total fishing trips) has the largest 
access value followed by North Carolina and Louisiana while Alabama (3.2% of total 
fishing trips) has the lowest access value among the Southeastern coastal states for all 
waves.  Again, there is no particular wave that has larger access value among all 
Southeastern states, and most fishing trips (23.83%) occur during the wave 3 (May-June) 
unlike the Northeastern coastal states with most fishing trips occurring during the wave 4 
(July-August).  In the Southeastern coastal states, flat fish species group provides the 
largest gain per trip from a one fish increase in historic harvest rate followed by big game 
and small game species groups while bottom fish species group provides the lowest gain   15 
per trip in all Southeastern coastal states.  There is not any noticeable variation across 
states in gains per trip from a one fish increase in historic harvest rate of all targeted 
species groups.   
   In evaluating the mean values of access per trip by state, we should not add these 
values together across states to calculate the access value of multiple states since these 
values are calculated under the assumption that all of other alternative sites in other states 
are available to the angler.  Simply adding these values together provides incorrect 
measures of access value of multiple or all states in the region.  For the access value of 
multiple states in the region, all fishing sites in the considered states should be assumed 
simultaneously closed to calculate the access value of these closed states using equation 
(6).  Table 3 actually shows the access value of some multi-state areas: Gulf of Mexico 
and South Atlantic areas. To accurately calculate the access value of whole region, 
survey data from another region should be combined to create multi-region data.  
 
Benefit Transfer Welfare Estimation: Function Transfer  
  Since we have original welfare estimation results of marine recreational fishing 
value from the Northeast 1994 (Table 2) and Southeast 1997 data (Table 3) using the 
same benefit function (equation (6)), both regions could be a candidate for either the 
study site or the policy site for benefit transfer exercise.  Function transfer procedure 
begins with inserting the policy site values into the independent variables of the study site 
benefit function.  Using the study site benefit function and its parameter estimates with 
the policy site independent variable values, benefit transfer estimates of the economic 
value of marine recreational fishing for the policy site can be described as   16 











Study|Policy) is the study site expected maximum utility function under a 
current (changed) policy regime adapted to the policy site context by inserting the policy 
site values into this study site benefit function’s independent variables, and b1,Study is the 
study site parameter estimate of travel cost variable.  
One way of empirically testing the validity of benefit transfer procedure is to 
compare benefit transfer welfare estimates for the policy site with the original welfare 
estimates available at the policy site (convergent validity test).  The measure of 
convergent validity used in the analysis is 
 
(8)  dBT = (WTPBT – WTPPolicy) / WTPPolicy  
 
where dBT is the benefit transfer error measured as the percentage difference between 
benefit transfer estimates and the policy site’s original estimates, WTPBT is the benefit 
transfer welfare estimates for the policy site, and WTPPolicy is the original welfare 
estimates available at the policy site.   
  Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the results of convergent validity tests of the benefit 
transfer welfare estimates for NE and SE regions respectively as described in equation 
(8).  In the application of benefit function transfer procedure in a marine recreational 
fishing environment, the magnitude of benefit transfer error falls within 100% of the 
policy site’s original welfare estimates in general except for the benefit transfer estimates   17 
of marginal willingness to pay for a one bottom fish increase in historic harvest rate for 
SE 1997 (above 400%).  Benefit function transfer seems to perform better in estimating 
the mean access value of fishing sites than in estimating marginal willingness to pay for 
fishing quality in both regions with an exception of benefit transfer estimation of 
marginal willingness to pay for a one flat fish increase in historic harvest rate for SE 1997 
(less than 8% of benefit transfer error).  Another noticeable pattern is that benefit transfer 
estimates in both regions are generally underestimated compared to the policy site’s 
original estimates except for the marginal willingness to pay estimates for a one fish 
increase in big game, small game, and bottom fish species groups for SE 1997.  
 
Conclusions 
   With two highly similar original valuation studies, the technique of benefit 
function transfer is applied to the valuation of marine recreation fishing in the coastal 
states of the Northeastern and Southeastern regions of the United States.  Two welfare 
measures are estimated by transferring a two-stage nested random utility model of marine 
recreational fishing behavior: the mean access value per trip by state and wave and 
willingness to pay for a one fish increase in five-year historic harvest rate per trip by 
state and species group.  The convergent validity of benefit function transfer procedure in 
a marine recreational fishing environment is empirically evaluated by examining the 
percentage difference between original and benefit transfer welfare estimates for the 
Northeast (1994) and Southeast (1997) coastal regions.  Percentage differences between 
original and benefit transfer estimates for most benefit function transfer results are less 
than 100%.  Benefit transfer estimation of site access value generally involves with   18 
smaller benefit transfer error than benefit transfer estimation of marginal willingness to 
pay for historic harvest rate of species groups.  Benefit transfer estimates of marine 
recreational fishing value (site access value and marginal willingness to pay for historic 
harvest rate) for the Northeast and Southeast coastal regions seem to underestimate in 
general compared to original welfare estimates available at the same region.    
One critical limitation of testing benefit transfer procedure with the NE 1994 and 
SE 1997 data is that the source of benefit transfer error cannot be clearly distinguished 
between regional and temporal variations.  For function transfer, a behavioral relationship     
between marine recreational fishing and socio-economic and site characteristics variables 
is assumed to be identical at the policy and study sites.  If this assumption doesn’t hold 
because of regional (NE and SE) and/or temporal (1994 and 1997) variations, current 
data don’t allow us to identify which variation is more responsible for benefit transfer 
error.  Even when benefit transfer procedure adapts reasonably well to the differences in 
population and site characteristics, we still have two undistinguishable sources of benefit 
transfer error: regional and temporal variations that may lead to different behavioral 
relationships across different regions and points in time.  To identify which variation is 
more responsible for benefit transfer error, intra-regional (different years in the same 
region) and intra-temporal (different regions in the same year) data could be used for 
testing the convergent validity of benefit function transfer procedure. 
A comprehensive survey of benefit transfer’s historical background, 
methodologies, and procedures could help us answer a question of when, why, and how 
to use this highly empirical technique of obtaining economic benefits (or costs) in a 
number of circumstances where the results of past research in a similar context are   19 
available.  As is the case with most estimation techniques, benefit transfer has potential 
advantages and limitations with some necessary conditions for successful application that 
generates economically meaningful results.  For valid and reliable benefit transfer results, 
benefit transfer practitioners should carefully consider the strength and weakness of the 
technique, and apply it only in feasible circumstances with appropriate professional 
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Table1. Summary of Two Original Valuation Studies 


























Saltwater sport fishing: one day 
trip 
Saltwater sport fishing: one day 
trip 
Data    MRFSS-AMES: 1994 Northeast   MRFSS-AMES: 1997 Southeast 
States included  VA, MD, DE, NJ, NY, CT, RI, 
MA, NH, & ME 




two-stage nested random utility 
model (NRUM) 




WTP for site access to a state 
across waves
1 (3~6) & for one 
unit ? in historic harvest rate by 
state and 4 species groups   
WTP for site access to a state 
across waves (2~6) & for one 
unit ? in historic harvest rate by 
state and 4 species groups 
Choice set   3 fishing modes-5 target species 
& 63 county-level zone sites 
3 fishing modes-5 target species 




function   
Trip cost & time, # interview 
sites in a county zone, & site-
specific historic harvest per trip 
for species group 
Trip cost & time, # interview 
sites in a county zone, & site-
specific historic harvest per trip 
for  species group   26 
Table 2. Welfare Estimates from Northeast 1994 MRFSS-AMES Data 
 
The Mean Value of Access Per Trip   
State  All Waves  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5  Wave 6 
Connecticut  $5.31  $5.56  $5.70  $4.97  $4.58 
Delaware  $2.42  $3.42  $2.78  $0.93  $2.50 
Maine  $18.76  $20.29  $23.51  $21.83  $0.00 
Maryland  $29.66  $32.86  $27.99  $35.94  $17.24 
Massachusetts  $21.08  $22.31  $20.38  $25.50  $12.94 
New Hampshire  $1.31  $1.91  $1.52  $1.21  $0.00 
New Jersey  $34.90  $40.91  $33.19  $34.83  $28.89 
New York  $58.93  $58.39  $56.12  $57.85  $68.19 
Rhode Island  $9.91  $9.10  $10.35  $11.12  $8.18 
Virginia  $117.46  $79.89  $95.29  $113.04  $238.64 
Obs.  4897  1220  1675  1271  731 
 
Willingness to Pay for a One Fish Increase in Historic Harvest Rate Per Trip 
State  Obs.  Big Game  Small Game   Bottom Fish  Flat Fish 
Connecticut  281  $21.85  $8.10  $5.92  $16.12 
Delaware  190  $20.07  $7.38  $5.28  $15.19 
Maine  273  $25.12  $9.55  $6.91  $21.59 
Maryland  501  $25.67  $9.35  $6.52  $20.50 
Massachusetts  529  $22.29  $7.74  $5.55  $16.03 
New Hampshire  225  $22.83  $8.07  $5.77  $17.30 
New Jersey  793  $18.15  $6.54  $4.71  $12.96 
New York  678  $17.67  $5.81  $4.50  $12.00 
Rhode Island  349  $20.70  $7.50  $5.41  $15.73 
Virginia  1078  $16.27  $5.72  $4.76  $12.05 
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Table 3. Welfare Estimates from Southeast 1997 MRFSS-AMES Data 
 
The Mean Value of Access Per Trip   
State  All Waves  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5  Wave 6 
Florida (All)  $300.12  $351.54  $287.54  $299.89  $270.55  $306.23 
Florida 
West (Gulf) 
$60.66  $74.53  $58.09  $56.23  $58.15  $59.10 
Florida  
East (SA) 
$16.33  $17.01  $13.81  $16.84  $15.51  $19.23 
Georgia  $3.41  $1.17  $5.10  $4.45  $3.35  $2.40 
N. Carolina  $37.19  $21.74  $39.61  $38.02  $49.58  $32.44 
S. Carolina  $9.93  $10.02  $8.07  $9.37  $12.12  $10.12 
Louisiana  $16.58  $12.23  $16.81  $19.34  $16.41  $17.61 
Mississippi  $4.87  $4.61  $4.64  $4.64  $5.41  $4.96 
Alabama  $2.09  $2.37  $2.53  $1.85  $1.61  $2.07 
Gulf Coast  $113.42  $118.61  $109.15  $113.93  $114.82  $112.28 
S. Atlantic  $162.37  $112.10  $168.07  $161.58  $201.10  $154.29 
Obs.  6379  1039  1520  1115  1417  1288 
 
Willingness to Pay for a One Fish Increase in Historic Harvest Rate Per Trip 






Flat Fish   
Alabama  206  $20.17  $9.79  $3.32  $27.78   
Florida  
East (SA) 
1398  $20.36  $9.83  $3.38  $28.09   
Florida 
West (Gulf) 
2446  $20.78  $10.10  $3.47  $28.87   
Georgia  207  $20.23  $9.66  $3.40  $27.91   
Louisiana  776  $20.67  $9.90  $3.38  $28.92   
Mississippi  220  $20.85  $10.11  $3.48  $29.03   
N. Carolina  603  $20.47  $10.00  $3.46  $28.62   
S. Carolina  523  $20.89  $10.35  $3.60  $29.18   
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Table 4. Convergent Validity (Percentage Difference) Test of Benefit Transfer Estimates 
for Northeast 1994 
 
The Mean Value of Access Per Trip   
State  All Waves  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5  Wave 6 
Connecticut  11.03%  18.11%  7.96%  11.74%  4.12% 
Delaware  40.64%  13.20%  19.69%  230.29%  33.61% 
Maine  -57.31%  -53.08%  -59.50%  -58.86%  NA 
Maryland  -61.80%  -62.51%  -61.07%  -66.34%  -45.80% 
Massachusetts  -42.21%  -44.77%  -31.96%  -48.77%  -49.37% 
New Hampshire  13.72%  -10.54%  25.66%  19.69%  NA 
New Jersey  -56.33%  -57.02%  -54.15%  -58.96%  -54.92% 
New York  -59.21%  -59.01%  -58.04%  -59.31%  -61.54% 
Rhode Island  -16.38%  -12.26%  -10.88%  -20.52%  -30.17% 
Virginia  -65.81%  -66.74%  -66.45%  -64.11%  -66.10% 
 
Willingness to Pay for a One Fish Increase in Historic Harvest Rate Per Trip 
State  Big Game  Small Game   Bottom Fish  Flat Fish 
Connecticut  -91.96%  -89.97%  -97.03%  -79.90% 
Delaware  -89.58%  -87.42%  -96.65%  -74.60% 
Maine  -91.23%  -88.98%  -96.43%  -77.76% 
Maryland  -91.06%  -89.53%  -96.66%  -78.52% 
Massachusetts  -92.16%  -90.09%  -97.29%  -79.65% 
New Hampshire  -91.35%  -89.18%  -96.94%  -77.63% 
New Jersey  -90.15%  -87.76%  -97.13%  -76.27% 
New York  -91.52%  -88.60%  -97.25%  -78.56% 
Rhode Island  -91.93%  -89.79%  -97.03%  -79.37% 
Virginia  -86.90%  -82.84%  -96.41%  -68.31% 
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Table 5. Convergent Validity (Percentage Difference) Test of Benefit Transfer Estimates 
for Southeast 1997 
 
The Mean Value of Access Per Trip   
State  All Waves  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5  Wave 6 
Florida (All)  -31.46%  -31.53%  -31.50%  -31.31%  -31.49%  -31.46% 
Florida  
West (Gulf) 
-36.71%  -36.62%  -36.86%  -36.55%  -36.58%  -36.92% 
Florida  
East (SA) 
-35.80%  -35.86%  -36.12%  -35.89%  -35.15%  -36.00% 
Georgia  -35.86%  -36.20%  -35.72%  -35.75%  -35.63%  -36.62% 
N. Carolina  -31.60%  -31.02%  -32.33%  -31.50%  -31.24%  -31.57% 
S. Carolina  -35.86%  -36.01%  -36.02%  -36.06%  -35.82%  -35.49% 
Louisiana  -34.38%  -35.55%  -33.80%  -34.07%  -35.09%  -33.94% 
Mississippi  -37.64%  -37.88%  -37.84%  -37.47%  -37.37%  -37.71% 
Alabama  -35.98%  -35.91%  -35.70%  -35.75%  -36.34%  -36.31% 
Gulf Coast  -34.69%  -35.28%  -34.65%  -34.35%  -34.61%  -34.64% 
S. Atlantic  -30.23%  -30.70%  -30.31%  -30.34%  -29.96%  -30.12% 
 
Willingness to Pay for a One Fish Increase in Historic Harvest Rate Per Trip 





Alabama  90.30%  72.17%  413.15%  -6.36% 
Florida East 
(SA) 
89.95%  70.63%  421.61%  -5.67% 
Florida West 
(Gulf) 
86.06%  66.68%  409.95%  -7.58% 
Georgia  96.89%  74.63%  450.53%  -3.36% 
Louisiana  95.44%  74.88%  429.90%  -3.15% 
Mississippi  93.40%  74.30%  435.66%  -4.18% 
N. Carolina  98.03%  78.99%  457.40%  -2.05% 
S. Carolina  94.04%  76.45%  457.18%  -4.05% 
All States  90.57%  71.20%  425.71%  -5.52% 
 
 
 
 